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Cooperation and self-organized criticality are two main keywords in current studies of evolution.
We propose a generalized Bak-Sneppen model and provide a natural mechanism which accounts for
both phenomena simultaneously. We use the prisoner’s dilemma games to mimic the interactions
among the members in the population. Each member is identified by its cooperation probability,
and its fitness is given by the payoffs from neighbors. The least fit member with the minimum
payoff is replaced by a new member with a random cooperation probability. When the neighbors of
the least fit one are also replaced with a non-zero probability, a strong cooperation emerges. The
Bak-Sneppen process builds a self-organized structure so that the cooperation can emerge even in
the parameter region where a uniform or random population decreases the number of cooperators.
The emergence of cooperation is due to the same dynamical correlation that leads to self-organized
criticality in replacement activities.
PACS numbers: PACS Numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.-n, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question in the theory of evolution has
been how cooperation can emerge between selfish mem-
bers [1–7]. Another question is why evolution takes place
in terms of intermittent bursts of activities, which are
the characteristics of dynamical systems in a ‘critical’
state [8, 9]. Here, we propose a generalized Bak-Sneppen
(BS) model [10], which may solve the above two puz-
zles simultaneously. We take an approach of evolutionary
game theory and use the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games
to mimic the interactions among members. Each mem-
ber is identified by its stochastic strategy, specified by
its (history independent) cooperation probability (CP).
Here, a ‘member’ can represent an individual in a species,
an agent in an economical system or a species in an eco-
logical system. The fitness of a member is given by the
payoffs of the games with its neighbors. We then ap-
ply BS dynamics and replace the least fit member and
its neighbors by new members with random CPs. The
neighbors of the non-cooperator are likely to vanish due
to its low payoff, but the non-cooperator itself can also
be removed through the BS mechanism. As the non-
cooperators disappear, the overall CP increases, and a
new comer (with a random CP) will have a lower CP than
the increased average. Therefore, the new comer tends to
cause its neighbor to be the least fit, and the replacement
activity likely occurs at or near the new comer’s site. This
invokes the spatio-temporal correlation between the least
fit sites and can explain why replacements are episodic
as well as how cooperation emerges.
Evolutionary game theory has been one of the most
powerful tools in studying the dynamics of evolution [1].
However, a simple straightforward application of game
theory cannot explain the strong cooperation between
“selfish” replicators observed in nature and society. For
the evolution to construct a new, upper level of organi-
zation, cooperation amongst the majority of the popula-
tion is needed. However, the game theoretical descrip-
tion of interactions between members usually leads to
defections as evolutionarily stable strategies. Natural se-
lection, which has been a fundamental principle of evo-
lution, prefers the species that beat off the others and
oppose cooperation.
There have been numerous studies looking for natural
mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation among com-
petitive members [3, 11–13]. Recently, Nowak presented
a state-of-art review on the evolution of cooperation and
discussed five known mechanisms: kin selection, direct
reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and
group selection [2, 14]. Extensive studies provide the ex-
act conditions for the emergence of cooperation for each
of the five mechanisms. However, such conditions do not
seem to be general enough to explain the cooperative phe-
nomena observed everywhere. For example, for network
reciprocity, the benefit-to-cost ratio of a cooperative be-
havior should be larger than the average degree [2], but
this seems to be a rather strong assumption because the
degrees are quite large in most cases in real population
structures. Also, there have been a great deal of studies
on self-organized criticality in game theory [15–19], but
their dynamics leading to the critical states are not di-
rectly connected to the emergence of cooperation. Here,
we consider an evolutionary game on networks and show
that cooperation can emerge when the benefit to cost ra-
tio is larger than just 1 if we use the BS process. When
cooperators interact with defectors, they tend to disap-
pear, giving rise to an assortment of cooperators [20].
Furthermore, this behavior emerges in the long run even
with a small “chain-death” rate, ω, where the number
of neighbors that get replaced is less than one. For a
uniform or random arrangement of cooperators and de-
fectors, more cooperators than defectors disappear for
small ω, but in the long run, the BS process builds a self-
organized structure so that the number of cooperators in
the population increases.
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2II. MODEL
An influential model aimed to mimic the interactions
between competitive members in a population is the PD
game. It is one of the matrix games between two play-
ers who have two possible decisions, cooperation (C) or
defection (D). We consider a case in which the payoffs
are calculated by the cost c and the benefit b of a co-
operative behavior. If one player defects while the other
cooperates, the defector receives benefit b without any
cost whereas the cooperator pay cost c and its payoff be-
comes −c. For mutual cooperation, both get benefit b,
but pay cost c, and their payoffs become b− c while the
payoffs for mutual defection are 0. When we add c to
all elements so that payoff can be directly interpreted as
(non-negative) fitness, the payoff matrix becomes
C D
C
D
(
b 0
b+ 1 1
)
,
where we set c = 1 without loss of generality. With con-
ventional competition processes, the matrix game shown
above does not, in general, predict the evolution of coop-
eration. The birth-death process always predicts an evo-
lution of defection. Cooperation can emerge for death-
birth or imitation processes in a structured population,
but only with a (unrealistic) large value of the benefit-
to-cost ratio b for real populations [2].
Here, we consider the PD game interaction, but intro-
duce the BS mechanism [10] as the competition process,
and assume that the least fit member and its neighbors
are prone to disappear. Each member is characterized
by its strategy that determines when to choose the ‘de-
cisions’ C or D. We consider the history-independent
stochastic strategies, and the phenotype of a member,
say the ith member, is represented by its CP ci. The
history independent pure (deterministic) strategies, the
“always C” and the “always D”, correspond to the limits
of ci = 1 and ci = 0, respectively. The fitness of a mem-
ber is given by the sum of payoffs from its neighbors, and
the member dies out if its total payoff is the minimum.
The died-out site is occupied by a new member with a
new CP, which is drawn randomly from 0 to 1. Neighbors
of the least fit site may also be harmed in the process of
establishing the steady interaction with the new comer.
Hence, we replace the neighbors of the least fit site by
new members with the “chain-death” probability ω > 0.
III. METHODS AND RESULTS
We study the strategy evolution of a simple structured
population from the initial state of random strategies.
Initially, members in the population have cooperation
probabilities that are drawn randomly from the uniform
distribution of the interval [0 1]. They play PD games
with their nearest neighbors. We assume that each mem-
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FIG. 1: Real space configurations of (a) the CP ci and (b)
the RF f˜i for t ∈ [0, 6000] with ω = 1 and N = 64. They are
represented by colors, red for 0 and green for 1, as indicated
by the top panel. The black dots in (b) represent the least fit
sites.
ber plays sufficiently many games prior to the reproduc-
tion process and use the payoff expectation value as its
fitness. The least fit member with the minimum payoff
expectation is replaced by a new member with a new
random CP. In addition to the least fit member, the
neighbors of the least fit member are also replaced by
new members with the probability ω. Then, we recal-
culate the payoff expectations, and replacements occur
at the new least fit member and its neighbors. We con-
tinue these processes until the system reaches a steady
state and calculate the statistical properties of the popu-
lation, such as the mean cooperation probability, fitness
distribution, avalanche size (defined later) distribution
and etc.
For simplicity, we present our model and results in
a one-dimensional (1D) structure, but our main results
hold in other population structures. Initially (t = 0), we
assign a random CP, ci(0), to the site i for i = 1, . . . , N .
Then, we calculate the payoff expectation, fi(0), at time
t = 0,
fi(0) = b [ci−1(0) + ci+1(0)] + 2 [1− ci(0)] , (1)
of site i with a periodic boundary condition and find the
minimum payoff site, m0. Except this minimum site, m0
and its neighbors, m0 ± 1, the CPs are not changed at
t = 1, so we set ci(1) = ci(0) unless i = m0 or m0 ±
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FIG. 2: Time dependence of MCP, C, for (a,c) ω = 0.2 and
(b,d) ω = 1.0 for systems with N = 32, 64, 128, and 256. In
(a) and (b), the overall behaviors of MCP are shown while
the initial transient characteristics are shown in (c) and (d).
For ω = 0.2, MCP decreases first and then increases while it
monotonically increases for ω = 1.
1. The CP at the m0 site, cm0(1), is given by a new
random number between 0 and 1. For its neighbor sites,
cm0±1(1) is given by a new independent random number
with the probability ω, but remains as cm0±1(0) with the
probability 1 − ω. Now, we recalculate the payoff fi of
Eq. (1) with ck(1) instead of ck(0). We find the new
minimum payoff site, m1, of t = 1 and apply the same
replacement dynamics to get t = 2 configurations and so
on.
Figure 1 shows typical real space configurations of CP,
ci, and the reduced fitness (RF), f˜i = fi/(2b+ 2) ∈ [0 1].
We show the configurations for initial 6000 time steps of
a N = 64 system with b = 1.5 and ω = 1. Both the
CP and the RF are represented by colors, 0 by red and
1 by green. The least fit sites (black sites in (b)) and
their two neighbors are where the replacement activity
occurs. Comparison between the configurations in (a)
and their equivalents in (b) reveals that the least fit sites
are located where their neighbors are less cooperative
[relatively red in (a)]. The disappearance of the “red”
neighbors beside the least fit site by the BS-mechanism
shifts the overall system to green (more cooperative) with
time.
For a quantitative analysis, we measure the mean CP
(MCP), C(t) = 〈 1N
∑
i ci(t)〉, of the populations and
show the results in Fig. 2. Here, 〈·〉 represents the ensem-
ble average over many different realizations of random
initial configurations. Note that the MCP also represents
the overall fitness F (t) = 〈 1N
∑
i fi(t)〉 of the population
because it is linearly related to MCP:
F (t) =
1
N
〈
∑
i
b [ci−1(t) + ci+1(t)] + 2 [1− ci(t)]〉
= 2 + 2(b− 1)C(t). (2)
In Fig. 2, the MCPs for four different system sizes,
N = 32, 64, 126, and 256, are shown for two different
values of ω, 0.2, and 1. We use b = 1.5 for all fig-
ures in this paper, and all data are obtained from nu-
merical simulations. Because we have assigned a ran-
dom CP initially, the MCP starts from 0.5 at t = 0.
For ω = 0.2, the MCP decreases at the beginning and
then increases to the steady values while it monotoni-
cally increases from the beginning for ω = 1, as shown
in Figs. 2(c) and (d). Note that we have two different
elements in MCP changes. Replacement of the least fit
member (which is likely to have a high CP) tends to cause
the MCP to decrease while the replacement of its neigh-
bors (which probably have low CPs) likely results in an
increased MCP. The competition between these two el-
ements governs the early dynamics of the MCP. It can
decrease initially when ω < ωc ≈ 1k = 1/2, where k is
the number of neighbors. For a sufficiently large sys-
tem, there would be a site, m, whose CP, cm, is arbitrar-
ily close to one while those of its neighbors, cm±1, are
almost zero. Hence, the expectation of MCP changes,
∆MCP would be 1N
[(
1
2 − 1
)
+ kω
(
1
2 − 0
)]
and becomes
negative for ω < 1k at the beginning. However, as time
proceeds, the CP values develop spatio-temporal corre-
lations, and they govern the long-time dynamics. Ini-
tially, the isolated high-CP cooperators are likely to be
the least fit member, and they are removed as time pro-
ceeds. Then, surviving cooperators remain in the groups,
and, thus, have high fitness. Now, low-CP defectors can
be the least fit member, especially when they are next to
a very low-CP member. The replacement of these low-
CP member by new members with random CPs causes
the MCP to increase. Therefore, at a later time, the
MCP easily becomes larger than the initial 0.5 even for
ω < ωc. Now, a new comer with a random CP will have
a lower CP than the increased average of MCP. This in
turn causes the least fit site to be likely located next to
the new comer’s site, resulting in avalanches of replace-
ment activities.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL DYNAMICS
We start from the population with random strategies.
Hence, there is no correlation between the CPs initially,
and we may understand the initial dynamics through the
mean-field calculation. We first define the mean CP of
the replacement sites (before the replacement),
Crep =
1
1 + 2ω
(Cmin + 2ωCnei), (3)
where mean-field dynamics can be easily analyzed. Here,
Cmin is the average of the CPs for the least fit members,
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FIG. 3: Evolution of the CPs of the least fit members, Cmin,
their neighbors, Cnei, and members that are replaced, Crep,
are shown together with MCP, C, for (a,c) ω = 0.2, and (b,d)
ω = 1.0. In (a) and (b), the initial transient behaviors are
shown while overall behaviors are shown in (c) and (d). The
system size N = 128 is used for all cases.
and Cnei is that for the neighbors of the least fit mem-
bers. On average, CPs of 1 + 2ω sites are updated each
time. Since the average of the newly assigned random
cooperation rate is 0.5, Crep satisfies,
dCrep
dt
=
1
1 + 2ω
[(0.5− Cmin) + 2ω(0.5− Cnei)]
= 0.5− Crep. (4)
We measure Crep and present them in Fig. 3, together
with the CPs of the least fit members, Cmin, that of the
replaced members, Crep, and the MCP, C, for ω = 0.2
and ω = 1.0. The Crep curves are, indeed, well described
by Eq. (4). If we represent the numerical solutions of
Eq. (4) in the figure, they cannot be distinguished from
the Crep curves from the simulations because they are
almost identical. From Fig. 3, we also see that Crep en-
ters its steady value in a relatively short period of time
compared to C and rapidly converges to its steady-state
value of 0.5. For ω = 0.2, the initial Crep is more than
half and hence decreases to the steady value of 0.5 while
it increases from the value below 0.5 for ω = 1.0. For a
sufficiently large system, the initial value of Cmin would
be 1 while Cnei is 0. Hence, the initial value of Crep would
be 11+2ω , which is more than 0.5 for ω < 1/2. In this tran-
sient time of Crep, the dynamics of MCP, C, would be
mainly determined by the dynamics of Crep. Therefore,
C initially decreases for ω < 1/2 as does Crep. How-
ever, after Crep reaches a steady value, the correlation
of the replacement sites mainly governs the dynamics,
and C begins to increase. Let m be the least fit mem-
ber at time t− 1; then, at time t, cm is always updated,
and cj=m±1 are updated with probability ω. After re-
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FIG. 4: Fitness distribution d(f) in the steady states for five
different system sizes of N = 16, 32, 64, 128 and 256 with
(a) ω = 0.2 and (b) ω = 1.0. The system size dependence of
the effective lower and upper thresholds f∗L and f
∗
U (defined
in the text) are shown in (c). Legends of (a) are also applied
to (b).
placement, if the sum of the CPs at these three sites,
srep(t) = cm(t) +
∑
j=m±1 cj(t) (at the time t), is small,
at least one of m− 1, m or m+ 1 sites, is likely to have
small fitness. Therefore, they will be easily replaced in a
relatively short time. In other words, a new born member
with small srep(t) has a short lifetime and contributes less
to the C than those with large srep(t). This mechanism
makes C increase up to (almost) Cmin, and hence, the
system becomes cooperative overall. Thus, according to
our model, the emergence of cooperation is intrinsically
related to the dynamics leading to self-organized critical-
ity (SOC).
V. SELF ORGANIZED CRITICALITY
We now show that our model, in fact, drives the popu-
lation into a SOC state as in the original BS model. We
measure the distributions of avalanche sizes and distances
between successive least fit sites in the steady states and
show that they follow power-law distributions.
Following Bak and Sneppen [10], we would like to de-
fine the size of an avalanche as the number of subsequent
replacements at the least fit sites below the lower thresh-
old fL in its fitness value. The fitness distributions d(f)
share some characteristics of the BS model [10] although
their overall shapes are quite different. A crucial similar-
ity is that the fitness distribution d(f) in the steady state
becomes zero for fitness f smaller than a lower threshold
fL as the system size goes to infinity.
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FIG. 5: (a) Distributions d(s) of avalanche sizes s. Distribu-
tions with three different values of fL, fL = 2.41, fL = 2.42,
and fL = 2.43 are measured in systems of N = 256 in their
steady states. Data with fL = 2.42 show a most persis-
tent straight line in the log-log scale fit, indicating the lower
threshold fL = 2.42 for the N = 256 system with ω = 1. The
black line is the least-squares fit of the data for fL = 2.42
and is given in a form of d(s) ∼ s−τ with τ = 0.89 ± 0.05.
(b) A distribution d(x) of the distances between successive
minimum fitness sites in the steady states for the system of
N = 2048 with ω = 1. The black line is the least squares fit
of the data in the form of d(x) = ax−α with α = 3.17± 0.03.
The fitness distributions in the steady states for five
different system sizes are shown in Figs. 4(a) and (b) for
ω = 0.2 and ω = 1.0. As the system sizes increase, the
peak positions of the fitness distribution move to the right
to high values, and the peak widths become narrow. To
estimate the threshold values fL and fU , we define the
effective lower [upper] threshold f∗L(N) [f
∗
U (N)] as the f
value below [above] which the integrated distribution is
5 percent. We plot them against 1/N in Fig. 4(c) for two
different chain-death rates, ω = 0.2 and ω = 1.0. There
are no noticeable differences in the thermodynamic values
for the two ω values. Using linear fitting, we get rough
estimates of the threshold values, fL = 2.4 ± 0.05 and
fU = 3.1± 0.1, for both ω values.
For the avalanche size distribution d(s), we need a
more precise value of fL. We measure d(s) with several
different values of fL around the estimated value. If the
system is really in a SOC state, we expect the avalanche
size distribution d(s) to show a power-law distribution,
for the exact value of fL for the given system. Figure 5(a)
shows the distribution of avalanche sizes in a system of
size N = 256. We plot d(s) against s on a log-log scale
with three different values of fL around the value esti-
mated from Fig. 4(c) to pinpoint the threshold fL. For
ω = 1.0 shown in Fig. 5(a), the avalanche size distribu-
tion is well fit by a power-law with fL = 2.42. It remains
as a line in the log-log plot up to an avalanche size about
20000, indicating power-law distributions d(s) ∼ s−τ .
The exponent obtained from a least-square fit of the form
d(s) = Ay−τ is α = 0.89± 0.05. This value is consistent
with the known exponent of the 1D BS model [10]. The
power law indicates that the evolution occurs in a dy-
namical criticality [10, 21]. We measure the avalanche
distributions for other ω and b and found the critical ex-
ponent τ to be independent of the benefit-to-cost ratio b
or the chain-death probability ω.
We also measured the distance distribution between
successive least fit sites. Denoting the distance between
successive minimum fitness sites by y, we plot d(y) in
Fig. 5(b). The distance distribution is measured in the
steady states for the system of N = 2048 with ω = 1.
When the distribution d(y) is plotted against y on a log-
log scale, it also becomes a line, indicating power-law
distributions d(y) ∼ y−α with the slop α = 3.17 ± 0.03.
This exponent is also consistent with the known exponent
of the 1D BS model [10]. It is notable that our model
belongs to the same universality class as the BS model
in spite of the complexity in computing the fitness of
members and the non-trivial dynamics of the population-
fitness changes.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have considered the BS mechanism as a repro-
duction process with fitness given by a PD game pay-
off on a network structure. Our observation may have
more natural implication in economical systems because
the BS process with chain bankruptcy is a more feasi-
ble scenario. It might be worthwhile analyzing weekly or
monthly bankruptcy data and see if they follow a power-
law distribution as our study suggests.
We have simulated our model with other values of the
benefit-to-cost ratio b and see that cooperation emerges
in a wide range of chain-death rates ω, as long as b is
larger than 1. In contrast to a common belief, cooper-
ation can emerge even with parameters that a popula-
tion with random strategies decreases cooperation. This
is possible because the BS mechanism builds dynami-
cal correlations that suppress the long-term survival of
non-cooperators even in the region where mean-field cal-
culation predicts a decrease in cooperators. The same
dynamical correlation leads to SOC in replacement activ-
ities with the same exponents as the original BS model.
The strategy space presented here is rather small. Mixed
but only history independent strategies are considered on
a very simple population structure, a 1D lattice. How-
ever, we speculate that our main results, the emergence of
cooperation and SOC, are robust under variations in the
population structure or the strategy space extension. In
fact, the preliminary results with the extended strategy
space show that the emergence of cooperation appears
more easily and rapidly when the reactive strategies are
included.
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